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ABSTRACT 
 
In a period of student loan scandals and U.S. financial market instability impacting on the cost 
and availability of student loans, this paper looks at alternative models of higher education 
funding. In this context, it also considers the level of financial support that the government should 
provide to higher education.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
wo thirds of U.S. college 4-year undergraduate students graduate with some level of debt. In 2004 
the average student loan debt among graduating seniors was $19,237 (excluding PLUS loans but 
including Stafford, Perkins, state, college and private loans) (FinAid 2008). In addition graduate and 
professional students borrow even more for a graduate degree with debts in the range from $27,000 to $114,000.  
In recent years the financing of higher education has faced a number of challenges in the U.S.  In 2007 the student 
financial aid scandal exposed large financiers providing money and fringe benefits, such as cruises and stocks, to 
colleges and top officials to push their loans. At New York's Columbia University, the head of financial aid was 
suspended after allegedly netting $100,000 on stock in a loan company recommended to students. Despite students 
already having difficulties in affording higher education, in 2008 the impact of the low-doc housing market crisis 
spread to the market for student loans. 
 
Over the last decade, the cost of a college education in the U.S. has dramatically exceeded the growth of 
federal grants and loan limits in the Stafford Loan program. Increasingly, credit based non-federal or „private‟ 
student loans have been required to close the gap between state and federal financial aid, scholarships, limited 
family resources and the actual cost of attending college. Jack Remondi (2008) Vice Chairman and Chief Financial 
Officer of the largest provider Sallie Mae, states that the availability of these loans often means „the difference 
between attending or not attending the college of a student‟s choice.‟ Demand for federal and non-federal loans is on 
the rise. The U.S. Department of Education estimates that approximately 7 million borrowers will need more than 
$68 billion in federal loans with private education loans contribution a further $20 billion in 2008.  
 
Over 75% of federal student loans are financed by non-bank, specialty finance companies like Sallie Mae. 
Remondi (2008) argues that „the financing of federal student loans is reliant on a well-functioning and well-priced 
credit market….This is not the environment in which we operate today.‟  This has created a situation where every 
loan funded in the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) will be made at a loss. As a result of this there 
is expected to be a major shortfall in access to student loans.  
 
Further to this, FinAid (2008) has reported that more than 170 unduplicated lenders have suspended federal 
and/or private loan programs, including Sallie Mae. If loans can be attained, it is likely to be under conditions of 
greater security and increased cost. FinAid states that the volume of federally-guaranteed student loans is down by 
57% year over year and the cost of funds has increased by 137 basic points.  
 
T 
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The largest impact is likely to be on students from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Patricia Maguire, 
the President of Trinity Washington University, (2008) states that students at Trinity have a median family income 
of around $30,000 and rely heavily on federal student loans and private loans to fund their education. Nearly 90% of 
Trinity‟s students are Black, Hispanic, Asian or international in their immediate family identities.  Maguire argues 
that a reduction in the availability of loans or an increase in the costs would be “catastrophic for their academic 
careers and their life goals.” This is supported by King and Bannon (2002 p. 2) who state that “55% of African-
American and 58% of Hispanic student borrowers graduate with unmanageable levels of debt”.  
 
In light of this situation, this paper looks at two alternative methods of funding higher education and 
models the cost of implementing the strategies for students compared to the current student loans model in the U.S. 
These two alternative higher education funding options are the income contingent scheme that operates in Australia, 
and a new model, a Tertiary Education Levy, developed by the authors of this paper
1
. The paper will also consider 
the relative proportion of higher education costs that should be borne by the individual and the government. 
 
AN INCOME CONTINGENT SCHEME 
 
Income contingent schemes operate in a number of OECD countries in one form or another including 
Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. According to Chapman (2001 pp. 1-6)
2
 
Australia‟s Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) was the world‟s first income contingent charge. The 
basic features of the income contingent scheme, as distinct from the student loans scheme as applies in the U.S., are 
that the students pay a varying proportion of the costs of their courses and they borrow the tuition fees from the 
government.  The students do not begin to repay the debt till they have graduated and reached a certain income 
threshold. The income threshold in Australia was the average income of a first year graduate. Once they exceeded 
that threshold the graduate has to pay back a certain proportion of their income to the government through the 
taxation system (Table 1). Students had the option of either paying their HECS fees in full „up-front‟, or deferring 
„all or part‟ of their HECS with the option of „partial up front‟ payment. Students deferring „part‟ or „all‟ of HECS 
were required to take „out a loan‟ with the Australian Government. Students who paid in full „upfront‟ received a 25 
% discount, as did students with a „partial up-front payment‟ of $500 or more. The debt was indexed to the inflation 
rate without any interest charges.  
 
 
Table 1:  Repayment rates and Income threshold for Australia in 2004-2005 
Repayment Rate HECS Repayment Income (HRIa) 2004-2005 
Nil Below $35,001 
4% of HRI $35,001–$38,987 
4.5% of HRI $38,988–$42,972 
5% of HRI $42,973–$45,232 
5.5% of HRI $45,233–$48,621 
6% of HRI $48,622–$52,657 
6.5% of HRI $52,658–$55,429 
7% of HRI $55,430–$60,971 
7.5% of HRI $60,972–$64,999 
8% $65,000 and above 
a HECS related measurements are in Australian dollars unless stated otherwise. One Australian dollar was approximately 
equivalent to 75 cents U.S. in 2005. 
Source: Modified from Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2005 
 
 
An income contingent scheme was considered superior to its alternatives in Australia by the Wran 
Committee in 1988 and according to Chapman (2001 p. 2) was later recommended by the World Bank. The first of 
two main approaches considered inferior to the income contingent system, was a system of „up-front fees and no 
                                                          
1 This model was developed by Anthony Stokes and Sarah Wright. If someone else has developed a similar model we are not 
aware of it but will be happy to give credit where due. 
2 A fundamental aspect of the existing literature is the several reports written or co-written by Professor Chapman, who was an 
architect of the original HECS system.  
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government assistance‟. This system was disregarded on the premise that students would be required to have 
immediate resources which for several students would create the need for borrowed funds. The likelihood of a 
student gaining a loan for higher education costs would be minimal, as human capital would not be sufficient 
collateral, and students may not necessarily be in a position to re-mortgage a house or their parents‟ house.  
 
The other alternative, „up-front fees with government-assisted bank loans‟, may also have provided little 
assistance to students, as students would be required to pay interest and be means-tested for the loan.  Even if 
allowances were made for students who would not normally have passed the means test, the possibility of students 
defaulting on the loans would still exist and as a result create potential poor credit histories and debt.  This system 
was also rejected as the possibility that students could default a loan would be costly for both the government and 
taxpayers. Chapman (2001 p. 5) argues that an income contingent system avoids the problems associated with the 
above two alternatives, firstly, by featuring an „efficient collection mechanism‟ and secondly, through deferred 
income repayments.  
 
Students will make decisions on the courses they choose based on the expected cost of their education and 
financial and personal benefits they will receive as a graduate of that course. It is argued that the level of HECS 
students pay in Australia is based on the cost of the course and the future income the student will receive.  While this 
appears to be a fair and efficient system, Table 2 shows that this claim is flawed, as there are only a small number of 
courses where the student contributions accurately reflect both the cost of the course and the future income the 
graduate receives.   
 
 
Table 2:  The student contribution, government contribution, salary and unemployment rate for various university 
graduates for 2006 in Australian dollars 
HECS Student 
contribution 
(HECS)  ($) 
Commonwealth 
Government 
contribution ($) 
Median 
starting 
salary(a) ($) 
Average annual 
cash earnings(b) 
($) 
Unemployment 
rate(c) 
Band 3      
Dentistry  8170 15,332 68,000 97,365 0.7 
Law   8170 1499 42,000 69,597 4.0 
Medicine 8170 15,332 48,000 111,634 1.0 
Veterinary science  8170 15,332 38,000 57,762 0.6 
Band 2       
Accounting  6979 2466 37,000 61,490 5.9 
Agriculture  6979 16,299 38,700 64,854 7.9 
Human resources 6979 2466 40,000 61,672 5.9 
Marketing  6979 2466 40,000 59,904 5.9 
Computing  6979 7349 42,000 74,308 8.8 
Economics 6979 2466 40,000 65,057 3.8 
Mathematics 6979 4908 42,500 66,284 6.2 
Physical science 6979 12,232 40,000 79,274 13.6 
Surveying 6979 12,232 45,000 62,816 1.7 
Band 1      
Journalist  4899 4156 37,000 64,532 8.6 
Social studies 4899 6598 42,000 54,865 5.3 
Visual and 
performing arts  
4899 9037 33,200 44,195 12.0 
National priorities      
Education  3920 7251 43,400 62,088 2.6-2.9 
Nursing (registered) 3920 9692 41,000 64,740 0.7 
(a) The median starting salary for full-time graduates aged less than 25 (Graduate Careers, 2006).  
(b) Average annual cash earnings for full-time non managerial employees for persons (ABS, 2006 cat. No. 6306.0) 
(c) The percentage of graduates seeking full-time employment who are not working aged less than 25 (Graduate Careers, 
2006). 
Note: The income data in Table 2 are derived from a combination of sources. This is because no single source provided the 
income data for all occupations.  
Source: Commonwealth Government 2003, ABS (2006), Graduate Careers (2006) and Macken (2006). 
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In the case of students becoming dentists or lawyers they pay Band 3 level of HECS. The dental student 
receives $15,332 in government funding annually to study the course and as a graduate earns one of the highest 
average salaries at $97,365 per year. Students studying law pay the same level of HECS, as students becoming 
dentists, yet the cost to the government is one tenth of the cost of providing dentistry (receive one tenth of the level 
of government funding), while the average income lawyers receive is $27,768 per year less than the average income 
dentists receive. The effect of this is a distortion of the graduate labour market with universities providing places in 
areas of relatively higher funding and students selecting courses with relatively lower costs. 
 
Under the current HECS system some university students, such as law students, are paying fees equal to 
84% of the total course costs, while students becoming doctors and dentists are paying fees equal to 35% of the total 
course costs. 
 
Furthermore, the current higher education HECS funding system in Australia is characterised by both 
horizontal and vertical inequity. For instance, university graduates earning the same level of income, such as high 
school teachers, are repaying different levels of HECS debts depending on their major. In 2008 history and literature 
teachers pay Band 1 HECS levels, whereas business studies and economics teachers pay the highest level Band 3 
HECS rates. Similarly, university graduates with the same discipline areas such as economics teachers and 
economists, are repaying the same level of HECS debts for their discipline but are earning substantially different 
incomes. This is supported by the findings of variations in the Private Rate of Return (PRR) to a university degree 
for different groups of university graduates shown in Table 3. This table also shows that the return to society from 
higher education, the Social Rate of Return (SRR), in a number of cases is greater than the return to the individual. 
(See Appendix for details of the calculations of the Private Rate of Return and Social Rate of Return). 
 
 
Table 3:  The PRR and SRR to different occupations for males for 2004 and 2005 
 PRR (80 %) SRR (80 %) 
Year   
2004    
Economist/financier 14.50 15.69 
Nurse 8.58 7.68 
Secondary teacher- humanities  6.79 7.13 
Secondary teacher- economics 6.49 7.13 
Secondary teacher- science 6.49 5.80 
2005   
Economist/financier 14.20 15.13 
Nurse 8.62 7.58 
Secondary teacher- humanities  6.75 6.95 
Secondary teacher- economics 6.37 6.89 
Secondary teacher- science 6.37 5.61 
Source: Wright 2008 Table 6.12 
 
 
There are a number of weaknesses with both student loans and income contingent schemes, such as the one 
operating in Australia. Bookallil (2004) suggests that for many students their concern is not with the level of the 
repayments but rather the size of the debt. Bookallil (2004) suggests several students are debt-averse particularly 
from low income areas, discouraging them enrolling in university. This is supported by Halpin (2004 p. 23) who 
states a survey of secondary school students in the United Kingdom revealed that male school students had shown a 
„sharp loss of interest‟ in university since the government‟s announcement to increase fees to 3000 pounds or $7700 
Australian dollars in 2006.  Halpin suggests the percentage of male students who expressed that they were likely to 
go to university had dropped from 70% to 66% and 20% of the students who said they would not go to university 
cited worries of student debt. For students who had both parents unemployed this rose to 30%.  
 
Numerous studies in Australia have also shown that students from low socio-economic backgrounds are 
debt averse (Aungles et al., 2002 and James, 2002). This is supported by a study conducted by Wright (2005) which 
showed that when HECS fees were increased in Australia between 1996 and 2001 the proportion of students 
attending university from lower socio-economic areas declined. 
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Karvelas (2004 p. 3) reported that a James Cook University survey of year 10 to 12 students, parents and 
teachers in 15 regional areas in Australia, also revealed students were worried about both an accumulating HECS 
debt and living away from home expenses.  
 
Warren and Sitaraman (2008) point out that “about 20% of low income students (in the U.S.) with good test 
scores (strong predictors of college success) never even apply to college. Taking on loans that are double the 
family‟s annual income is understandable daunting, so they become cautious, resigning themselves to less education 
and fewer lifetime opportunities- depriving themselves and America”.  
 
THE TERTIARY EDUCATION LEVY (TEL) MODEL  
 
An alternative model that overcomes many of the limitations of the student loans funding model in the U.S. 
and the income contingent scheme (HECS) model in Australia is the Tertiary Education Levy (TEL). It is based on 
the premise that higher education students should make a financial contribution to their studies that is based on both 
the cost of the course and the future income the university graduate will earn. The model suggested here also 
considers the benefits that both the individual (PRR) and society (SRR) gain from higher education. 
 
Table 4 compares the PRR and SRR of the U.S. to other comparable countries. It shows that unlike the 
other countries the SRR is higher than the PRR in the U.S. The PRR on average in OECD countries is 1.1 
percentage points higher than the SRR for males and 2.3 percentage points higher than the SRR for females. In the 
U.S. the PRR is 1.9 percentage points lower than the SRR for males and 0.7 percentage points lower for females. 
This suggests that higher education is being underfunded in the U.S. compared to the financial benefits that society 
gains from it. OECD (2008) data shows that this is mainly a result of the much higher direct costs (tuition fees) of 
tertiary education in the U.S. at 20% for males and 20.7% for women compared to an OECD average of only 5.8% 
for males and 6.0% for females. 
 
 
Table 4:  Private and Social Rates of Return to tertiary education (2004) 
Country Private Rate of Return Social Rate of Return 
 Male Female Male Female 
Australiaa 9.4 13.4 9.0 11.9 
Canada 9.4 9.1 7.9 7.3 
United Kingdom 14.3 14.5 12.6 12.9 
United States 11.0 8.4 12.9 9.1 
OECD Averageb 12.2 11.4 11.1 9.1 
a The data for Australia is taken from Wright 2008 Table 6.13 
b From the countries reported in the OECD tables 
Source: OECD 2008 Tables A 10.2, A 10.5 
 
 
The TEL model is designed so that student contributions would then relate to both the Private Rate of 
Return that the university graduate receives and the Social Rate of Return that society receives. A government could 
introduce a Tertiary Education Levy (TEL), whereby university graduates would have the option to pay a levy based 
on the course costs and the income that they earn, rather than paying „up-front‟.  Wright (2008) found that not only 
is society receiving a relatively high rate of return on individuals investing in a university degree, but the 
government is also profiting in some areas of higher education, such as commerce, in Australia. These findings 
suggest that the contribution made by students should be set at a lower percentage of course costs, for example 30 
%. The university graduate would pay the Tertiary Education Levy on the difference between the income they earn 
as a graduate and the median income of all employees (20-25 years of age).  In this example it is suggested that all 
students should pay 30 % of their course costs. By having a set percentage of course costs this would encourage 
decision making by students that would more accurately reflect the actual cost of their courses.  
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The formula for calculating the Tertiary Education Levy (TEL) is:  
 
 
 
t = TEL  
Yp = income premium. The annual income a graduate earned (up to $100,000) minus $30,000 (threshold), at 2005 
prices  
Cs = sum of course costs in 2005 prices 
r = the real rate of interest of three percent   
m = 650 (26 weekly payments for 25 years)  
RCs = remaining course costs. This is equal to the residual of the course costs from the previous fortnight plus 
interest charges from the previous fortnight minus the graduate repayments from the previous fortnight. 
 
The TEL model follows a basic reducible interest rate formula where the costs are repaid fortnightly over a 
25 year period. The model assumes a three percent real rate of interest (real 10 year bond rate in Australia) and a 
maximum of 25 years of earnings to pay the levy. Under the TEL model the more a graduate earns the more the 
graduate will pay for their education. However, there could be a cap on the levy a graduate pays, for example up to 
an income of $100,000 in any year. The graduate would pay the levy on a fortnightly basis.  
 
Based on the income profile estimates from the ABS Household Expenditure Survey (HES) and Survey of 
Income and Housing (HIS) 2003-04 Confidential Unit Record Files for Australia, a levy of 3% would equal 31.5% 
of average course costs or $13,900, and a 4% levy would equal 41.5% of average course costs or $18,575. Overall 
university graduates would pay a levy of 0.21534% per $1000 of course costs over a 25 year period. 
 
Table 5 compares the fortnightly repayments for an average male university graduate who defers their 
HECS repayments and TEL for 2005. Table 5 shows that the fortnightly repayments for an average male university 
graduate are higher under the income contingent scheme, HECS, than under TEL. Under the HECS system the 
average male university graduate will repay their HECS debt in nine years, whereas under TEL the male university 
graduate will pay a levy for 25 years. For the first 5 years a male student under TEL would pay an average 
fortnightly payment of between $16.30 and $21.73, compared to average fortnightly repayments of $85.16 under 
HECS.  
 
The highest fortnightly repayment under TEL is $52.64 at a 3% levy or $70.18 at a 4% levy, compared to 
$121.27 per fortnight under HECS. The average male university graduate when earning an income of $52,549 will 
pay $121.27 per fortnight under HECS, whereas under TEL they would pay between $26.02 and $34.69 per 
fortnight.  
 
Table 6 shows the average student loan repayment per fortnight based on the average debt of a 4 year 
qualified college graduate in the U.S. It is assumed the debt is repaid over 10 years or 15 years at real interest rate 
levels of 2.5% or 5.5%.  Comparing Tables 5 and 6 it can be seen that the TEL model has much lower repayment 
levels especially for low income earning graduates. The average first year graduate would pay $13.29 a fortnight in 
Australia, while the average U.S. student with a ten year loan would pay at least $121 a fortnight. The TEL 
repayments only rise with the graduates‟ capacities to pay, as the graduates‟ incomes rise with experience in the 
workforce or promotion. The TEL model graduate does not have a debt. They make repayments based on the cost of 
the course and income earned but if they do not earn the income threshold they do not make repayments. There is 
less fear or concern for debt in the TEL model compared to student loans or HECS. There is also less financial 
burden on the graduate. The graduates who gain the most from their education will potentially pay the most. The 
graduates who gain the least will potentially pay the least. It is suggested in this TEL model that at the end of the 25 
year repayment period there is no debt owing or further payments required. 
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Table 5:  The level of repayments for an average male university graduate for both HECS  
and TEL based on 2005 income levels in Australian dollars 
Years in the 
workforce after 
graduation 
Income for an 
average university 
graduate 
HECS fortnightly 
repayment 
TEL fortnightly 
repayment (3% levy) 
TEL fortnightly 
repayment (4% levy) 
1 $41,521 $71.86 $13.29 $17.72 
2 $42,788 $74.06 $14.76 $19.67 
3 $44,091 $84.79 $16.26 $21.68 
4 $45,428 $96.10 $17.80 $23.74 
5 $46,796 $98.99 $19.38 $25.84 
6 $48,195 $101.95 $20.99 $27.99 
7 $49,622 $114.51 $22.64 $30.19 
8 $51,074 $117.86 $24.32 $32.42 
9 $52,549 $121.27 $26.02 $34.69 
10 $54,043  $27.74 $36.99 
11 $55,554  $29.48 $39.31 
12 $57,076  $31.24 $41.66 
13 $58,607  $33.01 $44.01 
14 $60,141  $34.78 $46.37 
15 $61,674  $36.55 $48.73 
16 $63,200  $38.31 $51.08 
17 $64,714  $40.05 $53.41 
18 $66,210  $41.78 $55.71 
19 $67,682  $43.48 $57.97 
20 $69,123  $45.14 $60.19 
21 $70,526  $46.76 $62.35 
22 $71,885  $48.33 $64.44 
23 $73,192  $49.84 $66.45 
24 $74,439  $51.28 $68.37 
25 $75,619  $52.64 $70.18 
 
 
Table 6:  The average student loan repayment per fortnight in the U.S. in Australian dollarsa based on 2005 debt levels 
Period of loan repayment 4 year graduate debt 2.5%  real interest rate 5.5%  real interest rate 
10 years $25866 
($19400 U.S.) 
$121 
($91 U.S.) 
$140 
($105 U.S.) 
15 years $25866 
($19400 U.S.) 
$87 
($65 U.S.) 
$105 
($79 U.S.) 
a Based on 2005 exchange rate of one Australian dollar equalling 0.75 U.S. dollar 
 
 
SOME OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TEL MODEL 
 
a)  Encouragement for students from low socio-economic backgrounds 
 
Unlike student loans and HECS, TEL students are not faced with a debt. Under the student loans model 
students accrue a debt from the time they enrol in university and they must repay their debt when they graduate even 
if they do not gain a financial benefit from their college studies. There is a risk in investing in higher education. The 
student will be able to calculate their debt but they will not be able to measure their expected income with such 
certainty. As the OECD (2008: 187) points out “it is difficult to foresee one‟s labour market experience, tenure with 
a specific firm, whether one will work part-time, for a big firm, in the public sector, or in a job which does not call 
for one‟s skills.” Moss (2007 p. 2) points out that students “can ill afford any substantial delays in finding a job or 
any significant interruptions once their careers have commenced. They also may find it financially difficult or 
impossible to pursue less remunerated career options, such as teaching.” As previously mentioned studies have 
shown that students from low socio-economic backgrounds are debt averse (Aungles et al., 2002 and James, 2002). 
Wright (2008) reported that increases in HECS in Australia have caused the quantity of higher education demanded 
to fall, in particular from students from low socio-economic backgrounds. This in turn has resulted in a fall in the 
quality of university graduates, shown by the increase in the percentage of students within the top 10% of tertiary 
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entrance scores turning down university offers and a resultant increase in the proportion of students with low tertiary 
entrance scores being accepted into university in Australia. Under TEL students from low socio-economic 
backgrounds will not incur a debt but rather pay a levy (equivalent to 30% of the cost of the course) over a 25 year 
period. Once the 25 years of the levy is completed no further payments are required. This should increase applicants, 
consequently lifting the standard of university graduates.  
 
b)  Embrace vertical and horizontal equity  
 
The TEL model is characterised by both vertical and horizontal equity. Unlike the student loans or HECS 
system, graduates who earn a higher income will pay more for their university education. For example, under the 
student loans and HECS models both an economist and an economics high school teacher pay the same level of fees 
for their discipline despite the economist earning a higher income. Under TEL, the economist would pay a levy 
based on their income and therefore pay more for the extra financial benefits that they gained from their university 
education. This would restore vertical equity. At the same time, TEL will also encourage horizontal equity. 
Graduates with the same course costs and the same income will pay the same level of TEL. 
 
c)  A lower levy for the national priorities areas 
 
Due to the global shortage of nurses (Nowak, 2000 and Nowak and Preston, 2000) and the growing 
shortage of high school teachers (Preston, 2003, Stokes, 2005, Stokes and Wright, 2007) teachers and nurses have 
been made a national priority in Australia‟s higher education system. Similar problems exist in the U.S., the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) (2006) state nearly one in four American 
graduates who become teachers and approximately two out of five graduates who become social workers have 
unmanageable debt.  AASCU (2006 p. 2) argue “in the next ten years the country will need two million new 
teachers, but high student debt levels and low earning potential could discourage students from pursuing teaching or 
other public service careers”. In order to encourage individuals to study teaching, social work and nursing the 
government needs to lower the repayment levels so that the return on these occupations would increase. Under the 
TEL model the government could reduce the true cost of the course by lowering the levy, for example, from 3% to 
2% of the income premium for teachers, nurses and social workers. This would then provide an extra incentive for 
individuals to follow certain targeted professions.  
 
One of the problems the government faces in Australia is encouraging graduates in teaching and nursing to 
remain in the field. According to Wright (2008) the PRR was higher for an individual with an education degree than 
for a high school teacher. This suggests that the return is greater for an individual with an education degree working 
in fields other than teaching. A significant shortcoming of the student loan and HECS systems is that the cost of the 
course is tied to the qualification. Overcoming this weakness, the TEL model can have a levy linked to the 
occupation. Therefore, the government could encourage graduates to remain in the fields of teaching and nursing by 
only reducing the levy for teachers and nurses. Therefore, if a graduate leaves the teaching profession, for example 
to become an economist, they would no longer be paying the lower rate of the levy. In the case of the economics 
teacher, who earns the same income as another high school teacher for example an English/history teacher, they will 
pay the same levy for their university education under TEL (unlike student loans and HECS). This will then result in 
an equivalent PRR for teachers across the various discipline areas. 
 
d)  An increase in the overall level of government funding and an improvement in the allocation of 
resources  
 
Under the TEL model the government can determine the levy in regards to what level of contribution they 
want the students to pay as a proportion of total course costs. The relatively high Social Rate of Return on higher 
education and the SRR exceeding the PRR in the U.S. (Table 4) suggests that the government is not only 
underfunding higher education overall but profiting from areas of higher education. The government should make a 
larger contribution to the cost of higher education in the U.S.  This would not only lower the burden for students and 
increase access to higher education but would result in a shift in the cost of higher education to a level more 
comparable with other OECD nations.  These improvements in education would then flow on to increased benefits 
to society and the national economy including higher productivity levels. 
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VARIATIONS OF THE TEL MODEL 
 
There are a number of possible variations that could be applied to the basic TEL model as described. These 
could include: 
 
(i) The TEL model could include the option where the graduate stops paying the levy once their repayment 
total is 30% of the course costs plus interest. 
(ii) The TEL model could include the option where the graduate could pay off their TEL fortnightly repayment 
at a higher rate per fortnight or as a lump sum and therefore pay back the cost of the course in less than a 25 
year period.  
(iii) The TEL model could include travel and living expenses and other costs associated with tuition, such as 
textbooks. For example, an allowance of up to $10,000 per annum for assisting poorer students to attend 
university. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has shown that there are serious concerns relating to the use of student loans in funding higher 
education. There are approximately 7 million borrowers in the U.S. needing more than $68 billion in federal loans 
with private education loans contributing a further $20 billion in 2008. Not only has the financial crisis created 
problems with 170 lenders suspending student loan programs but it has also caused an increased cost of borrowing 
funds. In addition, King and Bannon (2002 p.2) state that “55% of African-American and 58% of Hispanic student 
borrowers graduate with unmanageable levels of debt”.  As a result of this it is important to consider alternative 
funding arrangements for higher education. The two models looked at here are the income contingent scheme, and a 
tertiary education levy. 
 
Income contingent schemes operate in a number of OECD countries in one form or another including 
Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The basic features of the income contingent 
scheme, as distinct from the student loans scheme as applies in the U.S., are that the students pay a varying 
proportion of the costs of their courses and they borrow the tuition fees from the government. The students do not 
begin to repay the debt till they have graduated and reached a certain income threshold. This model as applied in 
Australia as a Higher Education Contribution Scheme also has a number of limitations. Students are still faced with 
high levels of debt. Many students from low socio-economic backgrounds are especially debt adverse and less likely 
to pursue higher education. The HECS repayments the students make are also a financial burden for new graduates.  
Table 2 shows that the HECS system is inequitable and inefficient as the cost students pay do not reflect the real cost 
of running the courses or the future incomes of the graduates. In the case of students becoming dentists or lawyers 
they pay Band 3 level of HECS. The dental student receives $15,332 in government funding annually to study the 
course and as a graduate earns one of the highest average salaries at $97,365 per year. Students studying law pay the 
same level of HECS, as students becoming dentists, yet the cost to the government is one tenth of the cost of 
providing dentistry (receive one tenth of the level of government funding), while the average income lawyers 
receive is $27,768 per year less than the average income dentists receive. 
 
An alternative to these two schemes is a Tertiary Education Levy (TEL). The TEL model is based on the 
premise that higher education students should make a financial contribution to their studies that is based on both the 
cost of the course and the future income the university graduate will earn. The model suggested here also considers 
the benefits that both the individual (PRR) and society (SRR) gain from higher education.  
 
Table 4 shows that the PRR in the U.S. is lower than the SRR. The PRR on average in OECD countries is 
1.1 percentage points higher than the SRR for males and 2.3 percentage points higher than the SRR for females. In 
the U.S. the PRR is 1.9 percentage points lower than the SRR for males and 0.7 percentage points lower for females. 
This suggests that higher education is being underfunded in the U.S. compared to the financial benefits that society 
gains from it. OECD (2008) data shows that this is mainly a result of the much higher direct costs (tuition fees) of 
tertiary education in the U.S. at 20% for males and 20.7% for women compared to an OECD average of only 5.8% 
for males and 6.0% for females. 
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These findings suggest that the contribution made by students should be set at a lower percentage of course 
costs, for example 30%. The university graduate would pay the Tertiary Education Levy on the difference between 
the income they earn as a graduate and the median income of all employees (20-25 years of age).  In this example it 
is suggested that all students should pay 30% of their course costs. By having a set percentage of course costs this 
would encourage decision making by students that would more accurately reflect the actual cost of their courses.  
 
The TEL model follows a basic reducible interest rate formula where the costs are repaid fortnightly over a 
25 year period. The TEL model assumes a three percent real rate of interest (real 10 year bond rate in Australia) and 
a maximum of 25 years of earnings to pay the levy. Under the TEL model the more a graduate earns the more the 
graduate will pay for their education. However, there could be a cap on the levy a graduate pays, for example up to 
an income of $100,000 in any year.  Tables 5 and 6 show that the average repayments for the graduate are much 
lower under the TEL model than student loans in the U.S. or the HECS system in Australia. This would reduce the 
unmanageable levels of debt associated with other models and is likely to encourage a greater proportion of students 
from low socio-economics backgrounds to pursue higher education. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Methodology For Calculating The Rates Of Return To Higher Education 
 
Estimates of rates of return are based on the Mincer equation (Mincer 1958). The specific rates of return in 
this study are calculated using Formula A.1 (Borland 2002 p.2). 
          
  
Then:  
 
PVB – PVC = 0   and solve for r.  
 
Where:  
 
Ct = opportunity costs for university degree in year t; 
Bt = benefit of university degree in year t; 
n = length of education; 
m – n = years in workforce; and  
r = rate of return.  
 
The base rates of return in this study are calculated following the OECD approach in Table A1. The Private 
Rate of Return (also known as the Private Internal Rate of Return) is the rate of return on the individual‟s investment 
expressed as an interest rate. The Social Rate of Return (also known as the Public Internal Rate of Return) measures 
the return to society from both private and public investment in higher education as an interest rate. The monetary 
return is the gross wage premium, while the costs to society include both the opportunity cost to the individual and 
the cost to the government.  
 
 
Table A1: The OECD method of calculating the private and social costs and benefits of education 
 
Private costs =  Forgone earnings + direct private expenditures + increased future taxes 
 
  
Public costs = Lost tax receipts during the training + public expenditures 
 
  
Social costs =  Private costs + public costs  
 
  
Private benefits = Increases in earnings + higher probability of being employed 
 
  
Public benefits = Additional tax receipts  
 
  
Social benefits = Private benefits + public benefits 
 
Source: Modified from OECD 2008  
 
